The West as Anglo-America

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The near collapse of the neo-liberal financial order and the election of Barak Obama as President of the United States in 2008 signify both the fragility and resilience of Anglo-America. Wall Street financiers had convinced themselves and many others that the modern tools of finance had created an era of unending prosperity for all and super profits for themselves. And America's numerous foreign critics had dismissed out of hand the possibility that an African-American could be elected to the highest office of the land. In both instances the conventional wisdom underestimated the dynamism that inheres in global capitalism and America. What, if any, is the relationship between the two?

Anglo-America is a clearly identifiable part of what is commonly referred to as the West. Although it has lacked a formal institutional form, Anglo-America has been politically consequential for the last three centuries. Led by the British empire until the beginning and by the United States since the middle of the 20th century, Anglo-America has been at the very center of world politics. As a bridge between the European and the American West, Anglo-America is distinctive, not unique. These multiple Wests co-exist with each other and other civilizations as parts of one global civilization of modernity. And like all other civilizations Anglo-America is marked by multiple traditions and internal pluralism. Once deeply crystallized racial hierarchies take today the form of politically contested versions of multiculturalism. The internal core of Anglo-America is fluid, not fixed.

Supporters of a specific political project have called Anglo-America the Anglosphere. In the tradition of Winston Churchill's view of the English speaking peoples it enjoys support among conservatives as a

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community of states that is united by liberal values, Protestantism, the use of English language, and other ancient British traditions and that opposes other forms of the West, such as the European Union, the United Nations, and multiculturalism.\(^2\) Left-wing critics see in the Anglosphere a neoliberal, imperialist and furtively racist project. These critics can point to George Orwell’s nightmarish novel 1984 which detailed the tyrannical rule inside Oceania conceived of as a political amalgam of Britain, the United States, Latin America and Africa.\(^3\) These political disagreements aside, the historical record shows that Anglo-America has won all major wars since the late 17th.\(^4\) In two hot global wars and one cold one in the 20th century Anglo-America defeated challenges from both the Fascist Right and the Communist Left. Despite local and temporary setbacks, for more than three hundred years Anglo-America has been a central axis around which international politics has revolved.

The West is frequently invoked in public discourse as the most encompassing source of collective identity that tells us who we are, where we came from, where we are, and where we should be going. Civilizational identities are politically salient and have a direct bearing on core concepts of international relations, such as empire, race, sovereignty, and interdependence and also on political practices such as diplomacy and alliance formations. This is not to argue that Western civilization, even in its different manifestations, is the only source of collective identity. Nations and their various regions or localities as well as group, family and individual identities are also highly significant in situationally specific ways. Incessantly invoked, the “West” remains, however, the most general social category that provides political actors, commentators, and scholars with A sense of direction as they seek to understand who they are, what they believe in, and what they should do -- as states, governments, groups and individuals. As a modern equivalent to the now outdated concept of “Latin Christendom,” invoking the “West” can serve different purposes: highlighting distinctive contributions to humanity or extolling particular values as inherently superior to all others.\(^5\)

In this chapter I develop three arguments. First, with specific reference to Samuel Huntington’s, Louis Hartz’s and James Bennett’s insistence on the unity and singularity of Western civilization, America, and the Anglosphere I argue in Part 1 for the pervasiveness of multiple traditions. Referencing the chapters in this book, I sketch in Part 2 very different constructions of Anglo-America illustrated by the concepts of empire and race in its first, Anglo phase and sovereignty, diplomacy and special relations in its second, American phase. Part 3 argues that Anglo-America shows three different patterns of internal division and pluralism.

1. A Unified and Singular West? Huntington, Hartz and Bennett

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\(^3\) Vucetic, 2010, 1.

\(^4\) Mead 2007, 5.

\(^5\) Melleuish 2009, 239.
The West exists, I argue, only as multiple traditions that have currency in America, the Americas and Europe and adjacent territories. The Americas and Europe offer contrasting images of the West that Anglo-America straddles. This pluralistic manifestation of the West is internally pluralist.

Yet, during the last half century different analysts have written as if the West was unified and singular. Samuel Huntington and Louis Hartz are the two scholars who have shaped profoundly our thinking of the category of “the West.” Huntington, the social scientist, advanced an argument about a civilizational clash between “the West” and “the rest” that prompted his critics to ask Who are We? the title of his last book. As he moved from a general civilizational argument to a more specific American one, Huntington continued to stress a unitary view of both civilizations and American culture. Hartz, the political theorist, moved in the opposite direction. He first articulated a compelling argument about the omnipotence of America’s unitary liberal tradition before putting what might have appeared to his readers as an exceptionalist argument in a broader, Euro-centric context. The liberal offshoot that implanted itself on the American soil was comparable to other fragments of Europe’s political ideologies that took root in other parts of the West constituting Anglo-America. What all of these fragments shared was the experience of having remained frozen, lacking the vitality of an intellectual dialectic that might have propelled them forward. As a new and global world is stripping away the protection from these Anglo cocoons, that vitality is now being imported from other civilizations, themselves offshoots of the intellectual vitality of European theories and ideologies. The arguments Hartz and Huntington have advanced have been important in informing contemporary writing, especially by neo-conservative thinkers, such as James Bennett, about the role of the Anglosphere in the creation of a new global civilization. Rather than seeing the various offshoots of American and European liberal tradition as being frozen and devoid of intellectual vitality until reawakened by the forces of a world revolution, as does Hartz, Bennett sees them as the vital sources of energy and initiative which are destined to lead by virtue of their progressive values and innovation-prone institutions. Despite the richness of their insights and the argumentative power of their writings, I argue that Huntington, Hartz, and Bennett all fall prey to the fallacy of thinking in unitary and singular categories.

Huntington. With the end of the Cold War Samuel Huntington saw a new cultural context in which states would henceforth act. The old ideological confrontation between capitalist democracy and communist totalitarianism, he argued, was replaced by a new kind of clash between the West and the Rest. With the end of the Cold War civilizations were destined to become the most salient cultural context for international relations. Ascriptive traits now define the identity of individuals and states and thus help shape their interests. Compared to ethnic groups, nations or language communities, civilizations operate at a higher level of inclusiveness. Since their building blocs are variable

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7 Huntington 2004.
8 This section develops further arguments made also in Katzenstein 2010a, 7-10.
9 Huntington 1996, 1993a,b.
constellations of religion, culture, language, values, traditions, and memories, Huntington concedes that civilizations cannot be defined easily and with any degree of precision. Like Doctor Doolittle’s push-me-pull-you, Huntington’s argument appears to have two heads and thus can take on all comers. Under the wide umbrella of civilization, identities are contested and can be reconstructed through a politics that is forever in flux. Kemalist reformism thus can be explained within the context of Islam as can significant reform efforts in Mexico, Australia or Russia. Yet this is not the central thrust of Huntington’s argument which stresses instead that the basic factors defining civilizations are objective and unchanging. Underneath civilizational multiplicity Huntington thus discovers, ominously, a profound split between the “West” and the “rest.” Civilizations are culturally unified contexts that are increasingly tending toward differentiation and clash.

Huntington often writes as if civilizations themselves were actors which, just like culturally coherent nation-states, balance and bandwagon. In this formulation civilizations appear to be coherent and compact. They operate as both the deepest cultural structure, most resistant to penetration from the outside, and the broadest of all cultural contexts. Viewing civilizations as billiard balls, Huntington insists that contacts between civilizations have been intermittent at best and normally non-existing. In Huntington’s conceptualization core states are carriers of particular civilizations; other states line up behind such core states and support them for reasons of civilizational identity. This is Huntington’s argument about the United States as the leader of Western civilization. After the Cold War conflicts within civilizations will decrease, conflicts between civilizations will increase, and the most violent conflicts will occur along the fault lines separating civilizations or states. Furthermore, Huntington also predicts a decline in the West and in American power. The superficial tokens of America’s power, for example in the domain of popular culture, activate in other civilizations a backlash that is stronger and politically more consequential than the thin veneer of the globalized culture that America is producing. As non-Western routes to modernity become better traveled, American and the West will be engaged in civilizational struggles with other modern civilizations.

Many scholars and practitioners have disagreed with Huntington’s specific assignments of different parts of the world to different civilizations and with his overall argument. And a number of statistical and qualitative studies refute his predictions that intercivilizational clashes and wars are more significant than intracivilizational ones. Other critics have disagreed with Huntington by emphasizing other factors in world politics. The most telling criticism of Huntington’s conceptualization of civilization has been directed against his view of civilizations as unitary cultural complexes that act and clash. Historically, for example, the relationship between Islam and the West has encompassed many peaceful and enriching

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exchanges that simply cannot be covered by the concept of “clash”.\textsuperscript{13} Even today, Islamic jihadist movements are only a tiny part of a world civilization of enormous variety.

Recognition of the inescapable plurality that inheres in all civilizations is thus an indispensable first step if we want to avoid the mistake of assigning to all non-Western civilizations a compact otherness that relegates them to the status of being inescapably different from the West. Civilizations are most similar not in their similarities but in their differences. The precise normative content of the West illustrates the point. The list of traits that Huntington enumerates – the legacy of Greece and Rome, bicephalic religious communities, multiple languages, separation of Church and state, rule of law, social pluralism, representative bodies, and a tradition of individualism – is highly selective. It extols the tradition of Western Enlightenment rather than the tradition of genocidal warfare.

A final criticism focuses on Huntington’s highlighting of clash over all other forms of encounters or engagements. Donald Puchala offers a more nuanced set of categories of multiple kinds of encounters between fully developed civilizations, fully and partly developed civilizations and civilizations and other political communities.\textsuperscript{14} This more fine-grained conceptualization helps Puchala in offering a comparative analysis that covers many significant encounters during the last two thousand years. Based on his survey of seven different cases he concludes that: civilizations do not often clash although mature civilizations do; cultural borrowing is primarily uni-directional; advanced civilizations tend to be culturally resilient; and empires associated with civilizations tend to drive inter-civilizational relations.

In defense against his many critics Huntington asserts boldly that his is not a perfect theory but one that is better than any of the alternatives. The binary distinction that informed Cold War theorizing (East-West and North-South) no longer works. Thinking of the world as divided into a handful of civilizations is the right level of abstraction to capture a more complicated and nuanced reality. Huntington offers illustrative evidence in support of his argument and, for the most part, sidesteps or ignores most of the quantitative and qualitative empirical tests which tend to undercut his main claims. He insists, however, that, whatever its conceptual shortcomings and empirical weaknesses, viewed as a paradigm his beats all rivals and thus cannot simply be dismissed.

At the center of the disagreement between Huntington and his critics lies the issue of cultural cohesion. Clifford Geertz writes that “cultural systems must have a minimal degree of coherence, else we would not call them systems; and by observation, they normally have a great deal more. But there is nothing as coherent as a paranoid’s delusion or a swindler’s story. The force of our interpretations cannot rest, as they are now so often made to do, on the tightness with which they hold together, or the assurance with which they are argued.”\textsuperscript{15} And so it is with civilizations as loosely coupled, internally differentiated systems of social meaning. They provide important multiple contexts for world politics, as Huntington


\textsuperscript{14} Puchala 1997, 2003, 117-42.

\textsuperscript{15} Geertz 1973, 17-18.
correctly establishes. But they lack the cultural coherence with which his cultural realism seeks to imbue
them.

That coherence view is central to Huntington’s view of the United States and America.\textsuperscript{16} Although his
views have shifted over time, Huntington initially proposed a single tradition theory of America.\textsuperscript{17} He
defined the American Creed first and foremost in terms of political ideals of rights, democracy and the
rule of law. Twenty-five years later, in his last book, Huntington rejects this view as too one-sided and
insists that the American Creed has been rooted primarily in a culture shaped by dissenting
Protestantism and English political traditions that are now at risk.\textsuperscript{18} This more recent view of the
American Creed is broader in the sense of incorporating both cultural and political components, and
narrower in the sense of including fewer types of people. His original conception, inspired by Hartz,
Huntington now argues is inadequate for building or rebuilding America’s walls. The thrust of his
civilizational argument is division and clash; the focus of his Creedal argument is assimilation or
exclusion.

Huntington views the American Constitution as the source of liberal political ideals and a secular,
constitutional patriotism that simply lacks sufficient Creedal power. The glue that holds America
together is not the Constitution but a culture of 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} century dissenting Anglo-Protestant sects
expressing Christian religious commitments, adherence to a common language, and English concepts of
the rule of law, the responsibility of rulers, and the rights of individuals. That culture empowers
individualism, supports a strong work ethic, and creates a duty for individuals to create heaven on earth.
But as Alan Wolfe argues persuasively, the empirical evidence, both historical and contemporary, puts
into question some of Huntington’s most important claims.\textsuperscript{19} Like the West, America is marked by
internal pluralism not coherence.

Hartz.\textsuperscript{20} More than half a century ago, Louis Hartz developed an argument that has remained
foundational for how we understand America today.\textsuperscript{21} Hartz proposed a consensus view of American
culture and identity. Without a reactionary, feudal past, America lacks a revolutionary socialist future.
Lockean liberalism has snuffed out all alternative political traditions and imaginations. And American
liberalism is a frozen fragment of bourgeois liberalism, transplanted from the Old World to the New. The
American South, to be sure, resembled Europe in several ways. But after the Civil War it was relegated

\textsuperscript{16}The next two paragraphs are adapted from Katzenstein 2010b.
\textsuperscript{17} Huntington 1981. I would like to thank Rogers Smith for pointing out this shift in Huntington’s
thinking.
\textsuperscript{18} Huntington 2004.
\textsuperscript{19} Wolfe 2005.
\textsuperscript{20} The next paragraphs draw on Katzenstein (2010b).
to a position of political marginality. America thus remained in the iron grip of a tyrannical liberal tradition.

Hartz’ s insistence on the dominance of a single tradition in the United States is flawed. Rogers Smith has reworked an older scholarly perspective on dueling traditions, such as Jeffersonianism and Madisonianism, that preceded Hartz’s book. In so doing he has developed the multiple tradition perspectives now closely associated with his name. Addressing, among others, both Hartz’s and Huntington’s single tradition theories, Smith observes in his analysis that American political development was marked not only by egalitarian values of liberal democracy but also by inegalitarian and illiberal ideas that yielded substantial and serious clashes over America’s reigning ideas and practices. “At its heart,” he argues, “the multiple-traditions thesis holds” that not any one tradition but a “more complex pattern of apparently inconsistent combinations of the traditions” has shaped American history.

Specifically, Hartz’s liberal tradition argument overlooks America’s republican and racial traditions. For Hartz, conflict in America occurs within the liberal tradition – between majority rule and minority rights and between democratic and property rights. He thus overlooks America’s strong republican tradition. The rejection of monarchism led to the support of popular republicanism informed by Rome and ideals of civic virtue. This republican tradition had strong effects on Jeffersonian and Jacksonian conceptions of politics and a distinctive form of American communitarianism. Furthermore, Hartz’s liberal tradition argument has very little to say about the issue of race. In semi-feudal Latin America, slaves were placed at the very bottom of the social hierarchy, but they were not robbed of their humanity. In America’s non-feudal culture, slaves were denied their humanity and made pieces of property. Liberal slavery was thus more cruel and vicious than feudal slavery. But Hartz went on to argue that once humanity was granted, liberalism was more generous since it did not have within its own intellectual tradition arguments that could stop the demand for equality. The elimination of slavery was necessary to establish the hegemony of liberalism in Hartz’s argument; yet Hartz slighted the importance of race in American politics, a fact he reportedly regretted subsequently.

Louis Hartz’s second major book internationalizes and puts into comparative perspective his analysis of American liberalism. This is a daring book of comparative intellectual history, grounded in the core assumption that besides the United States the political imagination and traditions of the West in Latin America, South Africa, Canada and Australia are all fragments of European culture and ideology. In

23 Smith 1993, 558.
24 Pocock 1975.
26 Hartz 1964. David Hackett Fischer (1989, 783-898) develops a related argument to explain the “voluntarism” of American society in terms of the four British folkways, or “freedom ways,” associated with four distinct waves of English-speaking immigrants between 1629 and 1775.
Hartz’s treatment the West, America and Europe are indelibly fused into one unitary European core. Taking with them different seeds of theory and ideology, European emigrants implanted them in foreign soil and then watched them mature into a peculiar intellectual immobility that escaped altogether the European contagion of intellectual self-renewal. This affected in equal measure, Hartz argues, Europe’s feudal fragments in Latin America and French Canada, its bourgeois ones in the United States, Dutch South Africa, and English Canada, and its radical ones in Australia and British South Africa. Spread across the full arc of Europe’s intellectual revolution, these seven fragments evince “the immobilities of fragmentation.”

The escape from the European past also was an escape from the future enemies of Europe. Only now, after two centuries of stasis, has the decolonization movement hurled back at these fragments the “very Western revolution they originally fled . . . these societies in the midst of the variations they contain, are governed by the ultimate experience of the American liberal traditions.”

Whether feudal, liberal or radical, all fragments are conservative. Challenged by global intellectual developments since the middle of the 20th century, they are all forced to transcend their conservatism. To be sure the fragments have at times tried to recoil into isolationism, exploit their nationalism or erupt into hysteria. But in the end such reactionary responses did yield to being reconnected with the European intellectual imagination now playing itself out on a global scale.

European ideology thus refurbished could be extended to African and Indian relationships to instill a series of racial formulations altogether outside of the original European ethic. Transplanted fragments of European ideology thus became moral absolutes, national essences and different ways of experiencing racial lives. Extricating themselves from the intellectual battles and sources of renewal in Europe permitted the conservative fragments to unfold their own potentialities beyond the theoretical imagination of the Old World. Shrinking the fragments’ intellectual possibilities did not prevent new blossoms. Admittedly since European ideologies were ignorant of first-hand experience with racial issues, the fragments experience political battles over how to apply their different ideologies to questions of race. In feudal fragments debates about the incorporation of racially different groups of people focus on how to absorb them in a hierarchical society. In liberal and radical fragments the practice of racial rule is harsher in practice than in feudal fragments, as under slavery the focus is on total exclusion and the denial of the slave’s basic humanity. The racial question is thus swept into the traditionalism of each fragment’s politics, with no conceivable ways of dealing. In Hartz’s phraseology, with the non-Western impact of the challenge posed by alien cultures. And thus the indigenous evolving ethic of each fragment became the “exclusive defender of the Western faith . . . with only one imaginable way of dealing with the man outside the West.”

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27 Hartz 1964, 3.
28 Hartz 1964, 3-4.
29 Hartz 1964, 22-23, 44-48, 63-65.
30 Hartz 1964, 6, 9, 17-19, 49-63.
31 Hartz 1964, 19.
challenges they faced, and their unmistakable European descent in an intellectually Euro-centric world all speak to Hart’s eloquent restatement of his basic single tradition theory on a grander scale.  

_Bennett._ Anglosphere, not Anglo-America, is the concept that James Bennett deploys in his important book. In contrast to the analytical category of Anglo-America, conservative writers have tended to view the Anglosphere as a political project. A simple question starts off James Bennett’s book. As technology has changed exponentially since the end of the Cold War, what will be its effect on geopolitics? For Bennett the English-speaking nations will lead the globalization revolution which he calls the “Singularity”. Singularity arises from the confluence of affordable software and hardware technology and the commercialization of the internet. It will cure most of the scarcities and ills characteristic of modern life. With a dramatic decline in the costs of communication and transportation the new political order will not be shaped by warfare-, nation-, or economic-states but by cultural states knit together in what he calls a “network commonwealth.”

This commonwealth will be heir to increasingly outmoded forms of state power. Those culture states that are able to utilize the communications potential of the internet will unite to their advantage. Communications are made easier by a common language. Bennett sees cultures developing along linguistic, not geographic or interest lines. The most important factor of becoming a member of the network commonwealth is to have a high-trust society. In an era of information abundance citizens need to be able to trust each other and support the basic rule of law. Trust is thus the foundation of civil society that allows the development of strong states and free markets. Citizens of low-trust societies will only trust members of their family, clan or tribe and those they control directly. Since they cannot see any benefits accruing to themselves, they are unwilling to sacrifice for the greater good of national or international society. To survive and thrive in the network commonwealth, people need to trust those beyond the circle of personal loyalty. Governments in high-trust societies command allegiance and support without coercion.

Citizens will live simultaneously in “physical” and “virtual” spaces. With access to low-cost communications technology, people will be able to create their own virtual political communities. The geopolitical face of this new world therefore will bear only some resemblance to the world of today. Some parts of the world, such as Africa and the Balkans, will remain stuck in and stymied by the geographical world. They will feature low-trust societies. And they will not be able to join the network commonwealth. Others will be more lucky or more skillful.

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32 In an opaque and problematic book manuscript that wrestled with the writing of world history Hartz (1984, 264-85. See also Barber 1986, Riley 1988, and Roazen 1990) returned briefly to central themes of his first two books, placing them in a much broader civilizational and global context.

33 I am indebted to Sam Morgante for his excellent summary of Bennett’s 2004 book.

34 Bennett 2004, 3.
The leaders of the network commonwealth, Bennett argues, will be the members of the Anglosphere. For they are the fulcrum of a new global order. The Anglosphere produced “the first modern nation-state, the first liberal democratic republic, the first large secular republic, and the first industrialized society.”\(^{35}\) It consists of all predominantly English-speaking nations, including the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and South Africa.\(^{36}\) However, it is not limited to those living within the boundaries of predominantly English-speaking countries. Any English-speaking person has the potential to join the Anglosphere, including 300 million Chinese now representing the largest national group of English-speakers. In contrast to the 19th Century, location no longer determines a person’s culture. Nor will the Anglosphere be based on the 20th Century model of transportation. Instead, communication capacities will be the decisive cultural factor determining membership in the network commonwealth.

Following Huntington, Bennett argues that the Anglosphere is rooted in English exceptionalism predating the Reformation. England witnessed the rise of limited monarchy bound by common law and the Magna Charta rather than absolutist monarchy. The American Colonies imported this system of government, and preserved it when they declared their independence. The Anglosphere is composed of “cultural nations” rather than common nation-states. In contrast to nation-states cultural nations are not self-contained political entities. Yet around the crystallization of core values, they “have shown remarkable consistencies in dialect, customs, associations, loyalties, and characteristics – most of what nations (as opposed to nation-states) are about . . . To be part of the Anglosphere implies the sharing of fundamental customs and values at the core of English-speaking cultures: individualism; rule of law; honoring covenants.”\(^{37}\)

The core of the Anglosphere consists of the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, English-speaking Canada, and the English-speaking Caribbean. Less central but still belonging to the Anglosphere are states in which English is one of several languages, usually used only by the elites and urban middle-class as is true, for example, of South Africa. Colonized by the United States, the Philippines are a borderline state of the Anglosphere as Filipino is still spoken by a majority of the population. The outer Anglosphere is “English-using states of other civilizations”,\(^{38}\) including the Indian subcontinent, the former British Arabic colonies, and Israel. These states use English as a semi-official language, but the language used by the media is usually indigenous, and there is not an expectation that the business language should be English. Peripheral states of the Anglosphere have English as a second language as is increasingly true of states where other European languages once dominated. Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the rest of Southeast Asia also fall into this category, along with northern Latin

\(^{35}\) Bennett 2004, 67.

\(^{36}\) Roberts 2007.


\(^{38}\) Bennett 2004, 81.
America and Northern Europe. And as the Anglosphere grows in size and strength Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and southern Latin America will also move into this category.\textsuperscript{39}

The crystallization of Western civilization in the Anglosphere is made possible only because on matters of political union its members have been flexible (through union and secession) in their spatial composition or decomposition of regimes. The British North American colonies thus saw the answer to their problems not through reform but independence. Yet the Anglo-American relationship remains one of the strongest during the past two centuries due to a tradition of strong commercial and communication ties. And with the development of industry on both sides of the Great Lakes, the United States and Canada both also benefitted from unimpeded water routes from their heartland to the Atlantic. With this expansion of trade, war between Great Britain and the United States became economically too costly. Inter-Anglosphere conflicts are generally not aiming to destroy the opponent rather than correcting wayward behavior. In the American War of Independence neither side was looking to decimate the population of the other. The colonies would have been just as happy to achieve independence without war. In the Declaration of Independence, the founders claim that war was necessary to achieve independence, but that the British should consider themselves “as we hold the rest of Mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace, Friends.” From the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century on Britain and the United States formed an enduring alliance.

A network commonwealth has no hierarchy and the Anglosphere lacks a clear center. Hard and soft power is located in numerous urban “nodes” that influence but do not rule the Anglosphere. It was united under a single government for only 69 years, between 1707 and 1776, from the uniting of England and Scotland into Great Britain to the Declaration of Independence. With the exception of the War of 1812, since the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century the United States and Great Britain have had a special relationship. Furthermore, the rest of the British Empire’s relationship to Great Britain remained on good terms as these countries were granted their independence by legal means. Besides the bond of common language, it is a specific and largely peaceful shared history that has made the Anglosphere the center of the new network commonwealth.

\textit{Conclusion.} Unitary and singular accounts stress the crystallization of a broad consensus around core values and uncontested identities. This is the view of Huntington, Hartz, and Bennett discussed above. Others have followed their lead. Robert Kagan’s analysis of a deeply fractured West is based on a unitary view of the United States.\textsuperscript{40} The United States is a dangerous nation marked by mild family quarrels between liberals and conservatives who are equally ignorant of and dangerous for the world. In this liberal reading of the domestic sources of American foreign policy conspicuously absent is “race,” with the book’s index lacking even a single entry. Although for Kagan the West is deeply divided, America is fundamentally united. Similarly, Stephen Krasner has built a powerful explanation of U.S.

\textsuperscript{39} Curiously, China is excluded from Bennett’s list, Taiwan is not. Excluded also are Russia, central Asia, and Africa, as well as Iraq.

\textsuperscript{40} Kagan 2006.
foreign policy based on the Hartzian consensus theory of liberal America. And Walter Russell Mead, finally, argues that the United States as the center of Anglo-America is marked by selective racial-religious controversies that have maintained and animated its WASPish core. In this formulation Jews, but not other groups, have succeeded in joining the white, Protestant ruling elite.

2. Anglo-America: From Empire, Liberalism and Race (Then) to a Community of Complex Sovereignties, Shared Diplomatic Culture, and Special Relations (Now)

Neither “the West” nor Anglo-America are immutable. To prove this point it might be instructive to analyze renegade or marginal parts of the West – Germany in the first half of the 20th century and Russia at the beginning of the 21st century. Alternatively, one could analyze the West from one of its self-proclaimed alternative centers or extended peripheries -- France and Latin America. Such inquiries would likely lead to conclusions similar to those reached by the chapters in this book. Anglo-America incorporates competing and changing conceptions of identity and multiple and evolving discourses, practices and policies. I anticipate here the book’s three parts. First, at the beginning of the 20th century Anglo-America was viewed mostly through the conceptual lenses of empire and race. Second, by the beginning of the 21st century these lenses have been replaced by the concept of community which encompasses a variety of constructs such as complex sovereignty, shared diplomatic culture, and special relations. Finally, in its political economy Anglo-America is marked by an abundance of land as the main source of its wealth requiring massive waves of immigration; in its political ideology by changing discourses of race and multiculturalism that yield opaque political outcomes permissive of always contested practical arrangements.

Empire and Race. Around the turn of the 20th century theories of empire and racial conceptions of Anglo-America illustrated sharp racial and ethnic boundaries coexisting with the blurred lines of an imperial politics organized around different kinds of colonies, and subsequently, Dominions and the Commonwealth. Nineteenth century British imperialism occurred in close interaction with evolving visions of Anglo-America. The idea of an encompassing Anglo-American political association incited the imagination of a growing number of British commentators. Dynamic economic developments in America and other settler communities and the shrinking of space and time brought about by technological advances in transportation and communication made the idea attractive, especially in Britain. Some form of a Greater Britain would be desirable to help Britain extend its dominant position well into the 20th century. The animating source of British discussions was unease and anxiety about the rapid changes transforming technology, economy, society and Britain’s place in the modern world. America was both the object of admiration and of scorn. The question of the future of Britain and its empire, a possible union of all English speaking peoples, and the prospect of the Anglo-Saxon race were all deeply

41 Krasner 1978.
42 Mead 2007.
intermingled. “A range of arguments pointed to Anglo-America as a unified racial-political order: a singularity.” 43

To date historians disagree on the character of the vision of Anglo-America. Some see it as an extension of Anglo-America’s Lockean logic. Others see this as the period in which a rapacious liberalism conquered the world by whatever means. For most of the 19th century reality was probably more complicated than either of these two assessments makes us believe. The British empire, Bernard Porter argues, was globe-spanning. But the motives leading to its acquisition were mixed; its spirit was ambivalent; and its impact on the world was uneven, more so than either its supporters or critics have been willing to acknowledge. 44 One reason was the very different types of colonies Britain controlled: India, the British West Indies, trading posts and naval stations, and settlement colonies. Another reason was the fact that the acquisition and rule of many of the colonies was relatively easy and did not require an inordinate straining of either British resources or will. Furthermore, empire and emperor were terms reserved for the despised, tyrannical Bonaparte and his epigone rather than Britain with her free and democratic institutions. Furthermore, empire connoted restrictions on free trade and Britain was a freely trading country and a strong champion of the moral good that followed in the wake of free trade. Yet it is undeniable that, toward the end of the 19th century, Britain’s policy and public sentiment turned more explicitly and enthusiastically toward clearly imperialist ventures and embraced the idea of Anglo-America.

In chapter 2 Duncan Bell tracks the intellectual contours of the political-racial thought that accompanied and spurred on Anglo-America and British imperialism during the Victorian era. Theories of civilization and empire illustrate conceptions that had a powerful hold on political imaginations. These theories were fully racialized and envisioned preferred political orders dominated by Anglo-America. Although some observers emphasized unity with the settler colonies while others favored unity with America, unity, especially racial, of the Anglo-American world, was widely believed to extend Britain’s imperial run under the guise of an all-embracing global polity. The Anglo-American idea was more than an instrumental construct. Bell argues that as a world order argument it was a utopian space that was made possible by technological innovation and could be brought about by purposeful human action. A racial-political order dominated by Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-America held the promise of bringing justice and peace to a world convulsed by modernity and violence. Shorn of its explicit racial content, Bell argues, it has continued to inform American foreign policy to the present.

In chapter 3 Audie Klotz rounds out Bell’s analysis. She focuses her analysis on the margins of Anglo-America. Her central argument is based on an inversion of the conventional self-other distinction in contemporary international relations theory. Her analysis focuses on the conflict and tension between an internal other and an external self with particular attention to the marginal position of South Africa, India and Ireland. In contrast to our conventional view, the tension and conflict with the racial and

43 Bell 2010, 2.

44 Porter 2006, 17.
ethnic other is located in domestic politics while the self is located in the international politics of an Anglo community centering around Britain in the late 19th and during the first half of the 20th century. Her chapter examines two transitional periods, the growing demands for political autonomy first in the British Empire and subsequently among members of the League of Nations and the United Nations. The community between motherland and colony was at first deeply felt. But kinship gave way eventually to a sense of strategic partnership between Dominion nationalism and British imperialism—with two notable exceptions, the Boers themselves and parts of Francophone Canada. Demands for greater Dominion autonomy increased after the end of the Boer War. Yet World War I revealed, especially in South Africa, that Dominion nationalism helped cement imperial ties. The League of Nations bolstered Dominion demands for greater autonomy. Britain and the Dominions pursued foreign policies reflecting a security community based on political choice rather than imperial loyalty—with the exception of judicial appeal reflected in the Balfour Declaration of 1926 and the Westminster Statute of 1931. After World War II, Klotz argues, Britain and the Commonwealth had to wrestle with a rise in population mobility in the wake of decolonization as well as with the rise of multiculturalism as a byproduct of the rights revolution. During the 20th century South Africa moved from being a contested part of the imperial Self (during the Boer War) to an external Self (during the decades of Dominion and Commonwealth politics) and an external Other (during its pariah period between 1961 and 1994); Ireland and India traversed also deeply contested terrain over the boundaries between internal and external Self and Other, but with outcomes that differed from South Africa.

Anglo-American Communities: Complex Sovereignties, Shared Diplomatic Cultures, and Special Relations. World War II, the Holocaust, the break-up of the British empire, and the decline of the Commonwealth altered beyond recognition imperial and race-based notions of the Anglo-American West. Transnational opposition movements helped bring about change as they worked for the principle of racial equality and human rights and organized pan-African and pan-Asian movements. In 1919 the British empire and the United States defeated the Japanese bid to have a racial equality clause included in the Versailles treaty. After 1945, however, the tide turned decisively. The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the decolonization movement of the 1950s and 1960s provided a very different political context for civilizational politics on a global scale. With the exception of the Presidency of George W. Bush, justifications for empire have played a much smaller role than advocates of hegemony and multilateralism. Furthermore, explicit invocation of race has all but disappeared from public speech even though the language of modernization and economic development has provided some political space for the articulation of “neoracist” views which have a lineage to older race-based arguments.

These historical developments have permitted Anglo-American relations to become the exemplar for conditions of complex interdependence and transnational relations which arguably typify international relations in the age of globalization. This at least was the core claim of Robert Keohane’s and Joseph

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45 Lake and Reynolds, 2008, 335-56.
46 McCarthy 2009, 4.
Nye’s foundational book first published in 1977. Keohane and Nye identified complex interdependence as a novel condition in world politics. The source of interdependence between actors could be military as conventionally understood. But it could also refer to the vulnerability or sensitivity in non-military issues measured by the costs of pursuing alternative policies or change under existing policies. Complexity refers to the existence of multiple channels, the absence of hierarchy among issues, and the relative insignificance of military force. Finally, complex interdependence generates distinctive political processes in world politics. Conceived as two ideal types, complex interdependence contrasts sharply with realism. Neither type is readily identified in world politics. The main explanatory claim of Keohane and Nye holds that as the character of world politics is shifting from the “high politics” of security to the “low politics” of prosperity, traditional realist theories of world politics fail to explain observable changes in international regimes. With their empirical focus on US-Canadian and US-Australian relations, this logic is easily adapted to understand the politics within Anglo-America which approximates complex interdependence more than conventional power politics.

Louis Pauly and Chris Reus-Smit argue in chapter 4 that like other conceptual tools of international relations – hegemony, power, and autonomy among them – the concepts of complex interdependence and transnationalism do not capture the changing nature and tensions that mark the relations within Anglo-America. The reason is simple. They elide and overlook issues of collective identity and political legitimacy that have been central to how Canada and Australia have constructed and navigated their relationships with the United States. For significant periods since World War II Canadian and Australian identity and legitimacy made both countries deviate from the liberal international norms championed by the United States and adopt instead a more activist stance on a variety of highly salient political issues than did the United States. Furthermore, the international constructions of Canadian and Australian identity and legitimacy were rooted deeply in the two countries domestic politics. Finally, the different geopolitical and geo-cultural contexts have furthered distinctly different Australian and Canadian reconstructions of identity and legitimacy which the effects of globalization have magnified. In a self-review of their own book Keohane and Nye have acknowledged self-critically the importance of domestic factors, the lack of which, they write, “weakened the prospects for a deeper analysis of complex interdependence” and left the concept “hanging.” Indebted to the behavioral analysis that informed Keohane and Nye’s work on complex interdependence, “complex sovereignty” is a step toward a more probing analysis that connects the behavioral dimension of foreign policy to Canada’s and Australia’s reconstruction of identities, their domestic bases of legitimacy, and their practices and policies. Because the shifting identities inside Canada and Australia are sources of contestation rather than unity, they do not fit either essentialist conception of Anglo-America or unitary theories of international politics.

48 Keohane and Nye 1987, 740.
49 Grande and Pauly 2005.
Brian Bow and Arturo Santa-Cruz argue in chapter 5 that the US is relating to two very different Western civilizations. Canada ties it to the old European West, Mexico to the new American one. The diplomatic cultures of the two kinds of relations differ as do ideas of friendship and trust that have evolved over time. As the vastly stronger partner in both relationships the US seeks to elicit compliance based on common purposes and shared values rather than raw power differentials. And both Canada and Mexico play up these purposes and values to induce US self-restraint. When these arguments resonate, Bow and Santa-Cruz argue, on both ends of a relationship a “thicker” framework of shared norms emerges and creates a sense of community. Where it does not a “thinner” diplomatic culture may prevail, based on tacit understandings of how to avoid unnecessary provocations. In the two bilateral relations that difference is reflected in the existence of a more reflexive restraint of US power in its relations with Canada and a more strategic restraint in the case of Mexico. While Americans have habitually overestimated their similarities with Canada, the U.S.-Mexican war of 1846 has left an indelible memory that has made Mexico prefer an arm’s-length relationship and that has reinforced American perceptions of Mexico as alien, unpredictable and unreliable. At the same time it is also true that compared to other Central and Latin American countries, the U.S.-Mexico relationship is undeniably special.

In both cases the different diplomatic cultures are socio-cultural rather than geographic. In the case of Mexico the sense of social distance to the United States is in part ethno-nationalist not unlike some aspects of the relations between Quebec and the U.S. In Canada the indigenous rights movement creates a politics of difference quite distinct compared to the racial tone of the Chiapas conflict in Mexico. It is noteworthy that since the 1910 revolution, the indigenous peoples of Mexico officially have been considered to be part of the “nation.” In contrast to Canada, this conflict in Mexico lacks secessionist demands. In short, without detailed attention to the multiple Wests that Anglo-America bridges and the changing identities within the West, we are not able to comprehend its international politics as reflected in Canadian and Mexican foreign policies touching on issues of security and political economy.

Brendon O’Connor and David MacDonald amplify the same central point with specific reference to the relations between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, with Britain fading into the background in the American century. There exist a variety of “special relations” between countries. David Schoenbaum’s survey of this field highlights Anglo-American special relations between the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand; it includes also problematic or hostile special relations of the United States with Israel, Russia, and Iran; and it mentions also Germany and China.50 The notion of specialness is important because political constructions of cultural similarity, a strong sense of shared history and emotional identification are important for legitimation which the utilitarian calculus of Realpolitik, pragmatism, and the personal chemistry between individual leaders often fail to provide. For American foreign policy religious imagery and the imagination of modernity offer master narratives of American politics and culture that help define the special relevance or irrelevance of

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50 Schoenbaum 1998.
particular relationships. The story of the two antipodean allies of the United States, Australia and New Zealand illustrate this central point.

Material and Ideational Foundations of a Changing Anglo-America. The variation of the meaning of the West and Anglo-America and the differences in policies and practices that flow from these variations are incontestable. Chapters 8 and 9 provide analyses of the material and ideational foundations for the historical evolution of Anglo-America.

Helped by rapid technological advances in communications and transportation, the size of Anglo-America, James Belich argues in his bold and brilliant book, exploded in the 19th century. Without belittling other revolutions, the importance of institutions, the role of empires and networks, Belich focuses our attention on the settler revolution. The very term “settler” misleads us into thinking “stability.” Our stereotypes of “nomadic” hunters and “settled” farmers, however, has it the wrong way around. “It is agricultural societies that tend to be on the move; hunting peoples are far more firmly settled.” European empires, Belich writes, dominated one and a half continents for a century; European settlements ended up dominating three-and-a-third continents, including Siberia. Settlement not empire powered Europe’s expansion. And nowhere more than in Anglo-America. Cultural hybridity that draws from and generates multiple traditions is the shared characteristic of all successful settler societies.

The British Isles and the Atlantic United States as the two metropolises of Anglo-America shared a triangular structure.

“Each had an important junior partner, Scotland/New England, with a limited natural endowment but educated, enterprising, and migration-prone people. Each had a second ‘junior partner’, the South/Ireland, deeply split within itself into black/white and Catholic/Protestant, but a good source of the shock troops of settlement. Each had a wealthy and populous senior partner, England/Mid-Atlantic states, exploiting but also exploited by at least one of its junior partners . . . When we add this to the rift of 1783, which made the Anglo-world a hybrid of British and American . . . the Anglos begin to seem as remarkable for their hybridity as for their unity. There was no melting pot, but there was a thorough mixing of a few strong flavors.”

In various “Wests” across various continents the settler revolution followed its own rhythm varying between the compression of time that accompanied “explosive colonization” and the compression of space that came with “re-colonization.” Explosive colonization was spurred by mass transfers of settlers,

51 Belich 2009.
53 Belich 2009, 23.
54 Belich 2009, 42, 67.
55 Belich 2009, 68-70.
funds, goods and ideas. It created a boom mentality. After the inevitable bust the reintegration of settler colony and metropolis converted settler communities into long-range staples exporters, virtual hinterlands of the two megacities of Anglo-America, London and New York. Migrants and money flowed easily across existing political boundaries. The agricultural exports from the Great Plains fed London and New York, and London listed more American stocks than did New York. Social ties grew as the elite marriage market made women from New England move to Great Britain. The zenith of Britain’s empire coincided with the Boer War (1899-1902) as a potent symbol of its unmistakable vulnerability. Too weak to intervene militarily on the European continent, Britain’s empire had difficulties holding onto its extra-European colonies. The question is not why Britain’s empire declined and eventually fell apart, but why it lasted as long as it did. Belich’s answer holds that explosive colonization and stabilizing recolonization made the United States into a superpower and extended Britain’s status as a superpower by half a century.56

Herman Schwartz argues in chapter 8 that in the ensemble of civilizations Anglo-America, metaphorically speaking, has played the role of suburban sprawl to Europe’s core city and Asia’s working class slums. Undeveloped land creates capital from debt; and the interest on capital is to be served by the streams of future income derived from future land cultivation. Land and debt draws in pools of labor. Economic growth creates the racial, cultural and ethnic identity politics so characteristic of Anglo-America. With Britain as a partial exception, Schwartz traces three institutional forms that characterize Anglo-America as it transforms land into capital and draws in labor: the classic, absolutist sovereign state that controls overseas plantation economies and relies on coerced labor, exemplified first by Britain in Ireland; the decentralized and locally controlled state attracting immigration eventually from all quarters of the world, first show-cased in New England; and partially autonomous Dominion states populated for a long time largely by immigrants from Great Britain.

The conceptual world that informed Anglo-America has also changed dramatically over time. In the late 19th century, for example, students of international relations believed that Americans of British descent were innately superior to all other races. And they thought of Anglo-America as predestined to bring good government, economic prosperity and Christian religion to all of the other, inferior and less fortunate peoples of the world. Racial theories were the foundation of international analysis in the academy in Australia and the United States.57 In America the nascent discipline of “imperial relations” was informed by the biological rather than the territorial division of the world. The justification for racial hierarchy and exclusionary policies was widely believed to rest on evolutionary theory rather than imperialist history. The predecessor of the journal Foreign Affairs, founded in New York in the 1920s,


57 Cotton 2009, 643-44. In Australia the pervasiveness of racist thought created tensions with the statist realism and societal liberalism that was dominating scholarship at the outset of the 20th century. The problem persists as current rationalist theories of international relations and foreign policy rarely acknowledges the centrality of racial categories when analyzing world politics around the turn of the 20th century.
was the *Journal of Race Development*. \(^{58}\) In short, race was very much present at the creation of the Anglo-American discipline of international relations. Not so today when it cannot be found even at the margin of the rationalist categories that inform liberalism and realism.

Srdjan Vucetic argues in chapter 9 that Anglo-America is a vital bequest of the British empire to the world. The gradual loosening of Britain’s imperial bonds and the empire’s eventual disappearance left in its wake a number of peoples and states committed to liberal democracy, capitalism, common law and the English language. Despite the lack of formal bonds, or perhaps because of it, Anglo-America continues to punch above its weight in an international order once dominated by London and, for the time being, by Washington D.C and New York. Over time, Vucetic shows how the meaning of Anglo-Saxon identity has changed. He examines two historical moments: the late 19\(^{th}\) century as revealed in the political discourses of Anglo-Saxon liberals and a century later in the 1980s during the patriation of the Canadian constitution of 1982 and the Australian bicentenary of 1988. In the late 19\(^{th}\) century racial politics, he argues, was brutally direct in creating political hierarchies that were exclusionary. It remains a much debated and open question whether and how, a century later, liberal multiculturalism in Canada and Australia has either eliminated traditional race-based hierarchies (by emphasizing the idea and practice of cultural diversity in the era of human rights) or has merely concealed the racial-liberal symbiosis in a new kind of politics (that appears to accommodate diversity at the surface only to resist ever more strongly a more far-reaching transformation of its traditional core). \(^{59}\) Or whether, as Pauly and Reus-Smit argue in chapter 4, an opaque multiculturalism has had to accommodate itself with sullen sources of opposition through a series of pragmatic compromises that are always at risk of sliding back into past practices and at the same time hold forth the promise of evolving new practices to deal with ancient problems. Liberal multiculturalism has replaced racial liberalism but it has done so imperfectly and the terms of its ascendance are murky. Race continues to be a part of contemporary Anglo-American politics.

3. **Anglo-America: Three Patterns of Internal Division and Pluralism**

A unified conception of the West with Anglo-America at its center has been a favorite theme of a number of mostly conservative writers. \(^{60}\) The view of an unbroken lineage, however, is problematic. Much of the historical evidence points toward different genealogies and multiple understandings of the West. Focusing on the political, violent and unplanned synthesis of classical, Christian and Germanic influences between the fifth and the eighth centuries A.D., David Gress, for example, has traced a ruptured evolution of Western values, identities, practices and institutions that stretches “from Plato to

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\(^{60}\) Browning and Tonra 2010.
NATO.  

For Samuel Huntington, the unity of the West is a very recent product. Since its beginning America was the New World which defined itself in opposition to the corrupt and evil ways of the Old. Freedom, equality, opportunity and the future reigned on one side of the Atlantic, in contrast to repression, class conflict, hierarchy and backwardness on the other. Students of political economy have identified sharp differences between Anglo-America’s liberal market economies and the coordinated market economies on the European continent. And Robert Kagan’s analysis of the West’s division between peace and power, between the Kantian European legalistic world of norms and multilateralism and the Hobbesian American world of power politics. Unified conceptions of the West thus encounter inconsistencies when looking at the history of the West and contradictions when analyzing the concrete case of contemporary Anglo-American international relations.

Distinctive of Anglo-America is an internal pluralism that reveals three different patterns. First is the deep racial divide that characterized all of Anglo-America at the beginning of the 20th century and that in attenuated and different forms has continued to shape its internal politics subsequently in the United States, South Africa and Mexico. Second is New Zealand’s current transformation from its traditional White-Māori biculturalism into a new triculturalism that is blending together the indigenous Māori population with old British settlers and new Asian immigrants. Third, is the opaque multicultural politics of Australia and Canada which centers around long-standing, principled conflicts that have not stopped political practices yielding pragmatic accommodation.

In the late 19th century theories of white racial supremacy were part and parcel of widely-held theories of imperialism and Anglo-Saxon supremacy. The long history of the political construction of the white race is grounded in the institution of slavery, including the history of white slavery first practiced on a large scale by Vikings and Italian city states. Later Britain took a leading position among Europe’s imperial powers of selling its own peoples into bondage in faraway lands -- convicts and children prominently among them. Before the 18th century boom in the African slave trade, more than half of the British immigrants to the Western Hemisphere, or 300,000-400,000 people, came as unfree laborers.

Despite this long history of white slavery in the late 19th century the doctrine of the supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race was wide-spread. Anglo-Saxonism had a long political history reflected in English literature, law, and religion. In the 19th and early 20th century these constructs of the Anglo-Saxon past merged with a scientific racism that pegged Anglo-Saxons at the apex of the white races, ahead of all others. As the embodiment of the 19th century American renaissance, Ralph Waldo Emerson’s formidable intellect and prodigious literary output made him the “philosopher king of American white

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64 Painter 2010, 40-42.
race theory,” as Nell Painter argues in her deeply researched and carefully argued book.\textsuperscript{66} The binary distinction between white and non-white replaced the recognition of a multiplicity of races, religions and nations – such as Caucasian, Aryan, Chinese, Hindu, Malay, Blacks, Muslims, Japanese.\textsuperscript{57} Transnational in inspiration and identification, the political project of whiteness was nationalist in methods and goals. White settlers claimed their racial superiority as grounds for Aboriginal dispossession first and racist immigration controls later. With 50 million Chinese and the same number of Europeans as well as 30 million Indians migrating to new homes around the world in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, “whites only” became a widespread way of drawing a global color line. Education and literary tests first used in Mississippi in 1890 to disenfranchise black voters, were promulgated by self-styled Anglo-Saxonists like Henry Cabot Lodge and served as models for federal immigration restrictions in the United States, Natal and other British Dominions. In the United States well into the 20\textsuperscript{th} century the social fact of racial inequality was pervasive, illustrated by the re-enslavement of large numbers of black Americans between the Civil War and World War II.\textsuperscript{68}

Laws and policies based on mono-racial categories were undermined by a complex set of factors and series of events, including universalistic liberal principles that promised equality and growing numbers of racially mixed peoples.\textsuperscript{69} Cast for the most part in biological terms in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, racist theories were reformulated in socio-cultural terms in the 20th. It is a much debated question whether this shift from biology to culture has ended racism or shifted it to new terrains.\textsuperscript{70} In practice the difference between what is biologically innate and what is culturally deeply ingrained is by no means clear. Although the language in which race is discussed publicly has changed greatly, the political discourses, use of stereotypes, and targeted groups and individuals show great continuity. Many conservatives argue that the causes of inequality between the races and differential rates of social mobility are due to the deficiencies of the disadvantaged classes or underdeveloped societies. For them the causal efficacy of historical inequities rooted in slavery, racism and imperialism have lost their force in global markets and under conditions of equal opportunity. The sources of individual and societal failures are to be found in values and habits. Biologically equal, individuals and groups array themselves hierarchically in terms of culture. What needs to change is not the system in which individuals and groups operate but the help which they give themselves. Progressive critics of this line of reasoning insist instead that while traditional racist hierarchies have been dismantled their causal impact on the social conditions of individuals and groups has not. This historical legacy requires constant reform and action. Economic, political, structural and institutional causes recreate persistent inequalities along racial, class and other lines. And this legacy needs to be addressed through incessant political reform or radical transformation. It is pointless to adjudicate this deep-seated disagreement in the abstract. What matters to me is its

\textsuperscript{66} Painter 2010, 151, 151-89.

\textsuperscript{67} Lake and Reynolds 2008, 4,5, 9.

\textsuperscript{68} Blackmon 2008.

\textsuperscript{69} Basson 2008, 2.

\textsuperscript{70} McCarthy 2009, 11-13.
persistence. Publicly sanctioned racism is a thing of the past. But a deep internal divide over questions of race persists. And this is a powerful force for a pluralist politics.

The United States, South Africa and Mexico offer ready examples. Half a century after Brown vs Board of Education, in an era of sharp political polarization and mobilization Barak Obama’s Presidency illustrates the fact that America’s race problem has not been solved as much as it has been reconfigured in important ways. What was once unimaginable -- the election of an African-American as President -- has come to pass and opened up both, new political possibilities and ancient prejudices and hatreds. For better and for worse that single event has affected a seismic change in America’s collective imagination. The election of a Catholic John F. Kennedy in 1960 was important and so are the prejudices that a Mormon Mitt Romney encountered in 2008 when running for the Republican nomination. But these religious milestones and millstones are dwarfed by the significance Barak Obama’s election as an indelible marker in American history. At the same time, however, the election also opened the floodgates to a torrent of barely concealed racist commentary. South Africa’s history of race relations in the 20th century was marked by the 1948 decision of the Afrikaner National Party to institutionalize a regime of apartheid in the very year that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted. About forty years later Mandela’s South Africa shed its stigma of a pariah state and entered a new era of “multi-racial” politics. When the African National Congress won the first free elections in 1994 it initiated a new set of political choices, based on existing traditions and newly emerging ones, that made it possible to conceive of South Africa as a multi-racial democracy. Mexico, finally, like South Africa is living at the periphery of Anglo-America not in its midst. Like all of the Americas, with its Hispanic legacy Mexico has an indigenous population that makes race a relevant political category illustrated during the last two decades by the Chiapas rebellion. As a member of an alternate West, Mexico thus fits the general pattern of a contested identity politics and multiple traditions that also characterizes Anglo-America.

New Zealand illustrates a very different, second pattern of Anglo-America’s internal pluralism. New Zealand bridges the differences between its Māori, Pacific Islanders or Polynesian, European, and Asian populations. The non-European populations are growing now so fast that by 2025 almost half of the country’s population will be non-European. Open to external influences and living in a benign international neighborhood, New Zealand has been relatively open to a large influx of immigrants from Asia and the Pacific Islands. China’s rise is likely to reinforce rather than wall off that openness. Although it maintained restrictive quotas for Asian immigrants into the 1950s, in contrast to Australia, New Zealand never adopted a “whites only” immigration policy. Before 1908 Chinese were considered “friendly aliens” who could be naturalized as British subjects. Between 1908 and the 1950s Chinese and Asian immigration almost stopped but has since increased greatly so that Asians are now as numerous as Māoris. This indigenous population was marked by a strong culture, unified language and a fairly unified political movement in the North Island. The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi is the founding document of

71 Hochschild and Weaver 2010.

72 Macdonald and O’Connor 2010, 14-26.
the enduring myth of racial equality between Māori and white Zealanders. The promises of sovereignty over Māori land, access to resources and legal protection were often broken. Compared, however, to other indigenous groups in Anglo-America Māoris fared better. They had a large numerical preponderance throughout the country, a strong military tradition, internal cohesion and discipline. It was their power, not the generosity of white settlers, which made their lives under white rule comparatively comfortable. This is not to argue that the Māori population is economically and socially as well off as are whites. They are not. And in contemporary politics they do not enjoy institutional parity. But they have their own political parties, widespread influence, own a national television station, and have national funding to support Māori culture. Māori is one of New Zealand's official languages. Race relations are far from ideal in New Zealand, but they compare favorably with those in other members of Anglo-America.

With rising Asian immigration the growing economic pull of China cannot help but be of great significance in shifting the country's underlying identity politics. New Zealand was the first to recognize the PRC in December 1972, the first to sign a bilateral trade agreement after Hong Kong's return to China in August 1997, the first to recognize China as a market economy in April 2004, and the first to sign a free trade agreement with China in April 2008. Asia is no longer viewed as an undifferentiated other as was true as late as the 1950s. Instead New Zealand has for economic reasons become "Asia-literate". With economic ties, tourism, student exchanges all growing and with the number of immigrants from Asia rising fast, China is now funding language and culture programs in 26 Auckland schools enrolling about 10,000 students. These educational efforts enjoy the full support of the New Zealand government that sees KiWi ignorance as the greatest impediment for securing the country's position at the edge of high-growth Asia. What is likely to evolve is not a third Asia-in-New Zealand identity but a New Zealand-Asian hybrid identity that would be bolstered by the varieties of immigrants from different parts of China and Asia. New Zealand's traditional White-Māori biculturalism thus could evolve into a grudge (for the skeptics) or genuine (for the optimists) triculturalism, or a pluri-culturalism characterized by the spread of hybrid identities overlaying distinct cultural poles.

A third more complex and opaque multiculturalism typifies Australia and Canada. As Lou Pauly and Chris Reus-Smit argue in chapter 4, in both countries the conflict between the descendants of white settlers, indigenous populations, and early French settlers in Canada leaves unresolved the tension between the communal identities invoked by 18th century nationalism and the individualism of 19th century liberalism. Canada has managed to live with both as Quebec has carved out a lasting opposition, based on communal terms, to the multiculturalism that is Canada's official policy. Australia meanwhile is trying to hitch indigenous memories and Asian realities to Anglo-American sensibilities that retain a perceptible skepticism about the multiculturalism the country has come to espouse. It is these internal challenges rather than the relations with their Anglo-American partners that have posed the most serious political challenges for both countries. We recognize complex sovereignty as an important constitutive element of the Anglo-American West through these Australian and Canadian looking glasses. Unresolved differences over individual autonomy and group legitimacy, and the conflicts and
accommodations they engender, create a cutting edge for the civilization of modernity that embeds Anglo-America.

Pauly and Reus-Smit argue in chapter 4 that Australia’s self-understanding and institutionalized practices underwent a momentous shift in the 1970s. What had been a white, culturally defensive Anglo society that denied its indigenous people full rights and citizenship experienced nothing short of a revolution in social policy with the extension of full citizenship to the Australian Aborigines and an activist policy of multiculturalism and a change in immigration policy. The vast majority of the Australian population has virtually no contact with the Aborigines who account for less than three percent of the population, live in larger concentrations only in the outback of three states and a few urban ghettos, and have had relatively small direct impact on Australian identity, as contrasted with their indirect effect through shaping the self-understanding of Australians. Few politicians challenge multiculturalism openly and debate focuses on its meaning rather than its merits. As it espoused a more assimilationist version of multiculturalism than had the Labor Party it replaced, some culture and history wars erupted under the conservative Howard Government starting in 1996. Conservatives are skeptical about grand identity debates and have an inclination to just get on with things unquestionably Australian. They favor a relaxed and comfortable manner which does not have to confront constantly thorny issues such as offering an apology to atone for past violence or discrimination or the representation of Australia’s past in the new National Museum. Since many multicultural practices, such as land rights and affirmative action, have become fully institutionalized this can create an uncomfortable tension between institutions and still current attitudes.

In recent decades Canada’s internal pluralism has revolved around traditional ethno-nationalist and linguistic lines. After the end of the first global war in the 18th century, the descendants of French explorers and settlers found themselves in a set of British colonies that gradually moved toward political autonomy and in 1982 severed the last legal bonds to the British Parliament. In sharp contrast to the English-speaking majority, French-speaking Quebec insists on its distinct ethno-nationalist identity that should not be submerged in an all embracing post-national Canadian multiculturalism. Prime Minister Trudeau’s bold move to redefine Canadian identity along multicultural lines in the 1970s had to accommodate a murky compromise with the ethno-nationalist realities of a Quebec that insisted on the legitimacy of its territorial and group cohesion and refused to be dissolved into an atomized post-national society. On the question of Quebec, Canada thus evolved an opaque multiculturalism that celebrates enjoyment in diversity and experiences sullen indifference. With regard to Canada’s aboriginal peoples the outcome is even less hopeful. Quebec’s and Canada’s future is far from clear. Separation within Canada, secession from Canada, or submersion in North America all seem possible, as does a continuation of the status-quo. Stuck between its de facto biculturalism and rhetorical multiculturalism, Canada’s internal pluralism is beyond question. In sum, in three different patterns Anglo-America exhibits diversity and pluralism which are engaged in an identity politics that is both tortuous and vibrant.
Conclusion

Relations inside Anglo-America belong to the category of “warm” peace, part of a broad range of peaceful relations that encompass also “normal” and “cold” peace. It was not always so. The model for all special relations, between the U.S. and the U.K., for example, dates back only to the peaceful resolution of the diplomatic conflict over Venezuela in the 1890s. Since then, however, as Bruce Russett has amply documented community has prevailed over contention in British-American relations.

The brief and illusory celebration of the United States as the New Rome has revived the political project of the Anglosphere in the most recent past. It illustrates the plasticity of civilizational categories and their intimate links to perceptions of power shifts. So do the varieties of anti-Americanisms. When Walter Russell Mead titles one of his chapters “how they hate us” and, unmindful of the legacy of white race theory, writes at length about the world of the “Waspophobe,” he assumes, erroneously, that “them and us” are defined by clear boundaries. As I have tried to argue in this chapter, this argument is analytically flawed when applied to civilizations in general and it is empirically inaccurate in the case of Anglo-America. Anti-Western civilization discourse is a product of the West. And anti-Americanisms are part of liberal identity politics that opposes all attempts to impose eagerly imperial rule on an unwilling and unruly world. Contemporary civilizational world politics is inescapably plural and pluralist.

References


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75 Russett 1963.
76 Gamble 2007.
78 Mead 2007, 54-82.


